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Securing IAB SupplyChain objects 
ABSTRACT 
An online advertising marketplace comprises buyers and sellers, each with their 
intermediaries. A transaction is documented by a SupplyChain object, which includes a set of 
entities involved in the transaction. As presently drafted, the Interactive Advertising Bureau 
(IAB) standard that specifies the SupplyChain object is susceptible to tampering. For example, 
an entry in the SupplyChain object can be changed to falsely imply the involvement of a reputed 
player. Conversely, an item in the SupplyChain object can be changed to excise the involvement 
of other intermediaries. Per the techniques of this disclosure, a market player or intermediary in a 
transaction digitally signs their entry in the SupplyChain object. The SupplyChain object is 
thereby authenticated, intermediaries in a transaction are verified as genuine, and parties to a 
transaction enjoy higher levels of trust.  
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BACKGROUND 
An online advertising marketplace comprises buyers and sellers, each with their 
intermediaries. In the OpenRTB real-time bidding standard [1] of the Interactive Advertising 
Bureau (IAB), a transaction is documented by a SupplyChain object, which includes a set of 
entities involved in the transaction. The SupplyChain object enables buyers to see everyone 
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involved with offering a bid request for sale, from publisher to demand-side platform (DSP). An 
entry within the SupplyChain object includes an advertising system identifier (ASI) and the 
seller/reseller account identity of the associated entity. 
The SupplyChain object enables transparency in the SupplyChain, thereby reducing ad 
fraud. However, the SupplyChain object is susceptible to tampering. For example, a malicious 
supply-side platform (SSP) can change an entry in the SupplyChain object to falsely imply the 
involvement of a reputed player. By doing so, buyers can get the false notion that the reputed 
player participated as a seller, thereby falsely making the ad impressions appear trustworthy. 
Conversely, a malicious SSP can change an entry in the SupplyChain object to excise the 
involvement of intermediaries legitimately involved in the supply of inventory. The malicious 
SSP can misrepresent to buyers that it has received a direct request from the publisher, that it is 
not a reseller, and that the associated inventory is only available from the malicious SSP.  
Per the open real-time bidding (OpenRTB) standard, an entry of the SupplyChain object 
comprises two or more fields, some of which are described in the table below. 
Name Description 
asi 
Advertising System Identifier. The canonical domain name of the SSP, exchange, 
header, wrapper, etc. that bidders connect to. This may be an operational domain, if 
different from the parent corporate domain, such that WHOIS and reverse IP 
lookups can establish clear ownership. This can be set to the value used to identify 
sellers in an ads.txt file, if one exists. 
pid 
The identifier associated with the seller or reseller account within the advertising 
marketplace. This comprises the value used in transactions, e.g., OpenRTB bid 
requests, in the field specified by the SSP/exchange. Typically, in OpenRTB, this is 
the publisher ID. For OpenDirect it is typically the organization ID of the publisher. 
Table 1: Certain fields of the SupplyChain object, per OpenRTB and other standards 
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DESCRIPTION 
Per techniques of this disclosure, one or more fields are appended to each entry of the 
SupplyChain object to cryptographically protect the object from tampering or falsification. These 
additional fields are indicated in Table 2.  
Name Description 
next_asi 
The current node, which represents an intermediary in the supply chain, 
sets this field to the next intermediary (node) within the supply chain, e.g., 
the node to which the current node sends the ad request. 
digital_signature The digital signature of the current node. 
previous_asi 
The current node, which represents an intermediary in the supply chain, 
sets this field to the previous intermediary (node) within the supply chain, 
e.g., the node from which the current node received the ad request. 
 
Table 2: Additional fields of the SupplyChain object, serving to secure the SupplyChain object 
The digital_signature field enables each entity involved in a transaction to sign its entry 
in the SupplyChain object, thereby improving the integrity of the SupplyChain object. The 
next_asi and previous_asi fields in an entry of the SupplyChain object point respectively to the 
next and the previous entities of the transaction. Adding the next_asi and the previous_asi fields 
transforms the set of entities in the SupplyChain object into a singly or doubly linked list, further 
improving the integrity of the SupplyChain object. The digital_signature is the signature of a 
node of the linked list, generated by the intermediary represented by the node, and appended to 
the end of the linked list. 
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Fig. 1: Formation of SupplyChain object by different intermediaries 
Fig. 1 illustrates the coordinated formation of a SupplyChain object by different 
intermediaries in the SupplyChain. A SupplyChain object (102) is received by an intermediary 
N. Per the techniques, the SupplyChain object includes a linked list, a node of which includes the 
asi-field of the intermediary (104a), the digital signature of the intermediary (104b), a pointer to 
the next intermediary (104c), a pointer to the previous intermediary (104d), and other fields 
(104e). The receiving intermediary, identified by its asi-field (N), creates a node of the 
SupplyChain object (106) with similar fields, populates the fields appropriately, and appends it 
to the received SupplyChain object. A proper chain of trust is thus formed by an intermediary 
creating an entry of the SupplyChain object and appending it to the end of the linked-list of the 
SupplyChain object. 
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An intermediary digitally signs its appended SupplyChain object as follows. All fields of 
the to-be-appended SupplyChain object are populated. In particular, the digital signature field is 
set to the value of the digital signature field of the previous node in the supply chain. If such a 
node doesn’t exist, then the digital signature field is set to null. The digital signature of the to-be-
appended SupplyChain object is calculated using the private key of the intermediary. The digital 
signature field of the to-be-appended SupplyChain object is updated with the just-calculated 
digital signature. 
Verifying the chain of trust: overall integrity of the SupplyChain object 
 A recipient of a SupplyChain object can verify the overall integrity of the SupplyChain 
object as follows. Starting with the first node in the SupplyChain object, the recipient walks 
down the chain, comparing the next_asi field of a node with the asi-field of the next node. If the 
two fields don’t match, the supply chain has a gap; it is incomplete. Similarly, starting with the 
last node in the SupplyChain object, the recipient walks up the chain, comparing the 
previous_asi field of a node with the asi-field of the previous node. If the two fields don’t match, 
the supply chain has a gap. 
Verifying the chain of trust: integrity of each node 
 To verify the integrity of a node in the supply chain, e.g., whether a node has been 
modified during transmission, the recipient downloads the public key of the canonical domain 
included in the asi-field of the node. Such a public key can be obtained from a well-known URL 
in the domain, e.g., of the form intermediary_N.com/.well_known/public_key.txt. The recipient 
verifies the digital signature using the example pseudo-code illustrated in Fig. 2. 
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for each node in the SupplyChain object: 
      set copy_of_node = node 
      if previous_node exists: 
         set copy_of_node.digital_signature = previous_node.digital_signature 
      else 
         clear field copy_of_node.digital_signature 
      verify digital signature of copy_of_node using the public key  
      downloaded from node.asi and node.digital_signature 
Fig. 2: Pseudo-code to verify a node of the supply chain 
Attesting the beginning of the chain 
  A malicious SSP may supplant a received supply chain with a new, false SupplyChain 
object and claim itself to be the beginning of the supply chain. To guard against this possibility, a 
publicly verifiable attestation specifies the beginning of the chain as follows. When an ad request 
is generated, e.g., by an app or browser, the operating system of the device generates an ad 
request attestation token, one of the parameters of the token being the canonical domain name of 
the entity to which the request is being sent. The asi-field of the first node of the SupplyChain 
object is set to that canonical domain name. To verify the beginning of the chain, intermediaries 
compare the asi-field of the first node of the received SupplyChain object with that of the ad 
request attestation token. 
Reducing the size of the SupplyChain object during transmission 
  For well-formed SupplyChain objects, the value of the asi-field of one node is the same 
as the value of the next_asi field of the previous node, and the previous_asi field of the next 
node. The size of SupplyChain object can be reduced for the purposes of bandwidth optimization 
without sacrificing tamper-resistance, as follows. The next_asi value of the previous node can be 
omitted during transmission if it is equal to the value of the asi-field of the current node. 
Similarly, the previous_asi field of the current node can be omitted if it is the same as the asi-
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field of the previous node. During verification, if the next_asi field of a node that is not the last 
node in a supply chain is missing, the next_asi value of the node is assumed to be the same as the 
value of the asi-field of the next node in the supply chain. Similarly, if the previous_asi field of a 
node that is not the first node in a supply chain is missing, the previous_asi value of the node is 
assumed to be the same as the asi-field of the previous node in the supply chain.  
Client-side header bidding or mediation 
 Most communications between adjacent entities in the advertising marketplace are of 
server-to-server type, e.g., RTB calls over OpenRTB or other standards. However, some 
communication can be between server and client, e.g., browser. If an intermediary transmits a 
snippet comprising a SupplyChain object to a client browser, it may not receive feedback on how 
the snippet behaves when rendered in the browser. An intermediary in communication with a 
client can append a new node to the SupplyChain object and set the next_asi field of the 
appended node to client. In such a remnant line item, or similar, scenario, the snippet calls one 
server, e.g., the (N+1)st intermediary, with the SupplyChain object received by the Nth 
intermediary as parameter. The (N+1)st intermediary appends a new node using previously 
described techniques. An example of the fully constructed SupplyChain object is illustrated in 
Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3: Example SupplyChain object under client-server communications 
CONCLUSION 
Per techniques of this disclosure, a market player in an online advertising marketplace 
governed, e.g., by IAB’s open real-time bidding standard, digitally signs its entry in the 
SupplyChain object that documents a transaction. The SupplyChain object is thereby 
authenticated, intermediaries in a transaction are verified as genuine, and parties to a transaction 
enjoy higher levels of trust. 
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